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In re Fowlkes
326 F.3d 542 (4th Cir. 2003)
In re Williams
330 F.3d 277 (4th Cir. 2003)
L Fa4ts
LarryDonnell Fowlkes ("Fowlkes") filed an initial federal petition seeking
a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia under 28 U.S.C S2254 in which he made three claims: (1)
that he received ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) that the prosecution violated
Brady v Mar)Ia 1- and (3) that he was actually innocent.? The district court
denied Fowlkes relief and dismissed his petition under 28 U.S.C S 2244(d) (1)(A)
for failing to meet the filing deadline of one year.' On appeal to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Crcuit, Fowlkes added an impartial jury
claim to his original claims in a supplemental brief." The Fourth Circuit denied
Fowikes a certificate of appealability ("COA") and held Fowtkes's claims
"meritless."' Fowlkes subsequently sought from the Fourth Circuit pre-filing
authorization ("PFA") for a successive S 2254 habeas petition forwarding the
same claims as his initial petition as well as the impartial jury claim.6
BillyWdliams ("Williams") included the following two claims in his initial
federal habeas corpus petition to the United States District Court for the Eastern
1.
2.

373 U.S. 83 (1963).
InreFowlkes,326 F.3d 542,543-44 (4th Cr. 2003); Fowlkes v. Angelone, No. 00-6230,

2001 WL 1545484, at *1 (4th (ar.Dec. 5, 2001) (per curiam) (opinion not selected for publication);
see 28 U.S.C S 2254 (2000) (defining process for seeking federal writ of habeas corpus; part of
AEDPA); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that due process requires the
prosecution to produce evidence favorable to the accused upon request if the evidence is material
either to guilt or to punishment). Fowlkes was serving a fort}five-year prison sentence for his
convictions of accessory before the fact to first-degree murder, attempted capital murder, and
robbery. Foulkes, 326 F.3d at 543.
3. Foulke;, 326 F.3d at 544; se 28 U.S.C S 2244(d)(1)(A) (2000) (establishing a one-year
statute of limitations for filing an application for a writ of habeas corpus from the date state
proceedings conclude; part of AEDPA). The district court also rejected his actual innocence claim.
Foulkes, 326 F.3d at 544. For a complete discussion and analysis of the application of S
2244(d)(1)(A) in the capital context, see generallyjessie A. Seiden and Priya Nath, 16 CAP. DEF.J.
179 (2003) (analyzing Rouse v. Lee, 339 F.3d 238 (4th ar. 2003)).
4. Fozdkgs, 326 F.3d at 544.
5. Id at 544; Foulkis, 2001 WL 1545484, at *1.
6. Foulke, 326 F.3d at 544;se28 U.S.C S2244(a)(3)(A) (requiring the permission of a court
of appeals to file a successive habeas petition; part of AEDPA).
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District of Virginia: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel; and (2) denial of the
right to appeal! The district court denied his petition, and the Fourth Crcuit
dismissed his appeal! While Williams's S 2254 proceeding was pending, he
found evidence that perjured testimony was used to convict him. With this
information in hand, Williams filed a state habeas petition, which was denied.1"
Williams sought from the Fourth Circuit a PFA for a successive S 2254 habeas
petition based on his two previous claims and a new claim based on the use of
perjured testimony to convict him. 1
IL Hddin
The Fourth Circuit held that all of Fowlkes's claims had been previously
dismissed on the merits in his initial S 2254 habeas proceedings and were thus
barred by§ 2244(b)(1) and, even if the claims had not been in his initial petition,
Fowilkes's claims would not have satisfied the requirements of S 2244(b)(2).12
The court in In m Wdliani>" held, first, that the thirty-day response deadline for
the Court to respond to a request for a PFA in S 2244(b)(3)(D) was not mandatory and a violation of the deadline did not require that Williams's request be
granted. 4 Second, the court held that Williams's claims failed to meet the
requirements of S 2244(b)(2)." Because Fowlkes and Williams each failed to
make a prima facie showing of merit as required byS 2244(b)(3)(q, the court in
each case denied the request for a PFA. 16

7. In re Williams, 330 F.3d 277, 279 (4th Cir. 2003).
8. Wdllians, 330 F.3d at 278-79; se Williams v. Angelone, No. 01-8038, 2002 WL 220343,
at *1 (4th Car. Feb. 13, 2002) (per curiam) (opinion not selected for publication) (dismissing
Williams's initial federal habeas petition), at dziat 537 U.S. 844 (2002).
9.
Wdliian, 330 F.3d at 279.

10.
11.

Id
id

12.
Foulke, 326 F.3d at 543; s&-28 U.S.C S 2244(b)(1)-(2) (2000) (providing limits on the
ability of federal courts to review federal habeas petitions; part of AEDPA).

13.

330 F3d 277 (4th CAr. 2003).

(requimig a federal court of
14.
Wilian, 330 F3d at 280-81; se 28 US.C 5 2244(b)(3)
appeals to grant or deny permission to file a successive petition not ater thaa thirty days after the
filing of the motion; part of AEDPA).

15.

Wiuirns, 330 F.3d at 282-84;soe28 U.S.C S2244(b)(2) (providing requirements for fiing

a claim that was not presented in a prior habeas petition; part of AEDPA).

16.

Fordkes, 326 F.3d at 543; W'irn, 330 F.3d at 281, 284; see 28 U.S.C S 2244(b)(3)(C )

(requiring a second or successive application to make a "prima facie showing" that the application
satisfies § 2244; part of AEDPA); 28 U.S.C S 2254 (2000) (providing the requirements for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus; part of AEDPA).
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X.A rnld is
A. Fowlkes
In Fowlkes's first petition to the Fourth Circuit, the court ruled that all of
Fowlkes's claims were meritless and denied relief. 7 The court ignored the
strictures of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
("AEDPA') that require the courts of appeals to consider an application for a
GOA only on the basis of a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right and not "on the merits."" In denying Fowlkes's application for a successive
petition, the court acknowledged its past practice of deciding "the substantive
merits of claims presented on habeas without regard to the requirement of a
certificate of appealability."19 Despite the court's recognition of its improper
application of S 2253(c)(2) in Fowikes's original appeal, the Fourth Circuit ruled
that because it had denied all three of Fowlkes's claims on the merits, S
2244(b)(1) barred Fowlkes from "resurrect[ing] those claims."20
Concurring in the judgment, but not in the application of S 2244, Judge
Gregory found the majority's reliance on its original merits decision to be
contraryto the requirements of AEDPA and referred to the court's "gratuitous
finding" that Fowlkes's claims were "meritless" as dicta.2 Instead of ascribing
finality to the court's original judgment, Judge Gregory would have applied the
principles of res judicata to the claims presented by Fowlkes.22 Adopting the
analysis used by Judge Cudahy in Brardgin v United Stat,f 23 Judge Gregory
considered Fowlkes's ineffective assistance of counsel claim and Brady claim to

17. Foulkes, 326 F.3d at 544; see
Foudkes, 2001 WL 1545484, at *1 (finding Fowlkes's claims
"meritless" and denying a ODA).
18. Foulkes, 326 F.3d at 546; see 28 U.S.C S 2253(c)(2) (2000) (stating that a certificate of
appealability can only issue "if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right"; part of AEDPA).
19.

Fodkes, 326 F.3d at 546; seeMller-El v. Cockrell, 537 US. 322,348-49 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
(disapproving of analyzing the merits of a case without considering whether the
applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right); Swisher v. True,
325 F.3d 225, 230 (4th Car. 2003) (acknowledging improper a plication of AEDPA). For a
complete discussion and analysis of Szis/, see generally Maxwell C Smith, 16 CAP. DEF. J. 195
(2003) (analyzing Swisher v. True, 325 F.3d 225 (4th Cr. 2003) and Rowsey v. Lee, 327 F.3d 335
(4th Or. 2003)).
20. Foulkss, 326 F.3d at 545; se 28 US.C S 2244(b) (1) (stating that "[a] claim presented in
a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior
application shall be dismissed"; part of AEDPA).
21. Foulkes, 326 F.3d at 547-48 (GregoryJ., concurring); see28 U.S.C 2253(c) (2) (requiring
an applicant for OA to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right; part of
AEDPA).
22. Foulkes, 326 F.3d at 548 (Gregory,J., concurring).
23. 249 F.3d 584 (7th CAr. 2001).

concun
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be barred byclaim preclusion and thus barred byS 2244(b)(1).24 Judge Gregory
would have analyzed Fowlkes's third claim as a new claim.2" Nevertheless, Judge
Gregory would have barred that claim under S2244(b)(2) (B).26
Apparently in response to Judge Gregory's concurrence, the majority also
briefly analyzed Fowlkes's claims under S 2244(b)(2)(B). 7 Proceeding under S
2244(b)(2)(B)(i), the court found that the evidence supporting his ineffective
assistance claim was not supplemented in his new petition and that the evidence
supporting the claim had been available since the trial.28 The court noted that the
exercise of due diligence could have revealed anyevidence to support this claim.29
The court then analyzed Fowlkes's Bradyclaim and impartial jury claim under S
2244(b)(2)(B)(ii)3 0 The court found that the evidence presented byFowlkes to
support these claims did not prove that, but for the Brady violation and the
foreman's bias, no reasonable juror would have voted to convict."
B. Williams
1. 7hiitydyP&odUnder S 2244(b)(3)(D)
The court in W&=, first answered Williams's claim that S2244(b)(3)(D)
required that the court grant his PFA request as a remedyfor violating the thirty
day grant or denyperiod imposed on a federal court of appeals. 2 The court held
that the thirty-day rule is " 'precatory, and not mandatory.'"" The court found
24. Fou/ki,326F.3d at 549-50 (GregoryJ., concurring); seeBranniganv. United States, 249
F.3d 584,590(7th Cr. 2001) (CdahyJ., concurring) (finding that claims are distinguished bytheir
facts, not just bythe legal principle invoked); 28 U.S.C S 2244(b)(1) (barring claims filed in a prior
habeas petition; part of AEDPA).
25. Foulk5, 326 F.3d at 550 (Gregory, J., concurring).
26. Id at 547, 550 (Gregory, J., concurring); se28 U.S.C S 2244(b)(22() (providing for the
denial of a claim not previously asserted in a prior habeas petition unless the facts underlying the
claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by

clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error,no reasonable factfinder would have
found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense"; part of AEDPA).
27. Foulkes, 326 F.3d at 546-47.
28. Id at 547.
29. Id
30. Id
31. Id; sw28 US.C § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) (requiring that facts be proven by"clear and convincing" evidence; part of AEDPA). Fowlkes submitted into evidence two new affidavits implying
perjured testimony and pointing out that the jury foreman was a relative of someone possibly
connected to the crime. Foulk6, 326 F.3d at 544-45.
32.
Wil!iam, 330 F.3d at 280; 28 US.C S 2244(b)(3)(D) (providing thirtydays for a federal
court of appeals to grant or deny authorization to file a second or successive habeas petition; part
of AEDPA).
33.
W&=/iar, 330 F.3d at 280 (quoting United States v. Barrett, 178 F.3d 34,42 n.2 (1st Cr.
1999)).
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that when the issues are as important as they were in Wdliams's case, extended
consideration iswarranted.3 ' Williams relied on Terv Qain forthe proposition
that PFA motions must be granted or denied bya federal court of appea within
the thirty-daylimitation.36 In Ter,the Supreme Court recognized the difficulty
in meeting the thirty-day deadline when reviewing PFA motions and suggested
that courts of appeals rely on Supreme Court retroactivity holdings in order to
meet the deadline. 7 The Fourth Circuit stated that Williams's reliance on this
holding was misplaced and that nothing in the Tier decision contradicted the
court's finding that the thirty-daylimitation isnot mandatory.3 The court found
that the Supreme Court's general rule does not apply to "exceptional cases that
cannot be resolved more quickly."39
2. Applficn q'S 2244(b)
Next, the court analyzed Williams's three claims under S2244(b).4 As an
initial matter, the court determined the meaning of the statutory term "prima
facie showing" as used in S 2244(b)(3)(q. 4 The court recognized a difference
of opinion across the federal courts of appeals: the circuits differ on whether the
term represents an "exacting requirement or a relativelylenient one." 42 Nonetheless, every court of appeals to decide the issue has adopted the "prima facie
showing" definition from the Seventh Circuit in Bemt v UnitaiSuam,43 which
states:
By"prima facie showing" we understand... simply a sufficient showing of possible ment to warrant a fuller exploration by the district
court ....If in light of the documents sibmitted with the [PFA
34. Id;see neVial,115 F.3d 1192,1194 n.3 (4th Cir. 1997) (enbane) (ruling that extended
consideration of important issues justified the delay beyond the thirty days required by S

22440,)(3)(D)).

35. 533 US. 656 (2001).
36.
W irn, 330 F3d at 280; Tyler v. Cain, 533 US. 656,662 (2001) (creating general rule
for courts of appeals to utilize when considering PFA motions).
37.
T*Ier, 533 US. at 663.
38.
Wdliams, 330 F.3d at 280-81.
39.
Id at 281.
40. Id
41.
Id; swe28 US.C S 2244(b)(3)(q (2000) (stating that a "court of appeals may authorize
the filing of a second or successive application only if it determines that the application makes a
prima fade showing that the application satisfies the requirements of this subsection"; part of
AEDPA).
42.
W'iam, 330 F.3d at 281. GmpmRodriguez v. Superintendent, 139 F.3d 270,273 (1st
Car. 1998) (finding that S 2244(b)(3)(C) creates "a high hurdle), Bell v. United States, 296 F.3d
127, 128 (2nd Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (finding that S 2244(b) (3)(P does not create a "particularly

high standard").
43.

119 F.3d 468 (7th Cr. 1997).
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motion] it appears reasonably likely that the [motion] satisfies the
stringent requirements for the filing of a second or successive petition,
we shall grant the [motion]."
The Fourth Circuit adopted this definition of a "prima facie showing."4" The
court, in particular, pointed out that the standard does not require an inquiryinto
the merits of an applicant's claims but only requires "the possibility that the
claims in a successive application will satisfy' the requirements of S 2244."
Applying this standard, the court considered whether W liams made the
"requisite showing as to anyof his claims."" The court addressed Wiliams's first
two claims, ineffective assistance of counsel and denial of the right to appeal, and
found that these claims were filed with Williams's first habeas petition, which
meant they were precluded under S 2244(b)(1)." The court then turned to
Williams's third claim- perjured testimony- and analyzed it under S
2244(b)(2)(B).49 Section 2244(b)(2)(B) is comprised of the following three
components, all of which the defendant must prove: (1) the facts on which the
claim depends were not discoverable through the exercise of due diligence; (2)

the claim must describe constitutional error, and (3) the facts must provide "
'clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable
factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.'" 0
The court refused to resolve the controversy over whether the perjured testimony was discoverable before the filing of the initial habeas petition because its
decision to deny the motion was based on other grounds."
The court found that Williams made aprima facie showing that the prosecutor suborned perjury in violation of Williams's due process rights and thus
satisfied the second component? 2 The third component of the analysis, how
44.
W'diam, 330 F.3d at 281 (alteration in original) (quoting Bennett v. United States, 119
F.3d 468,469-70 (7th Cr. 1997));swBennett v. Unites States, 119 F.3d 468,469-70 (7th Cr. 1997)
(providing definition of "prima fade showing"); sa, eg, Bell v. United States, 296 F.3d 127, 128
(2nd Cr. 2002) (adopting the Seventh Crcuit B&wstandard); Reys-Requenav. United States, 243
F.3d 893,899(5th Cr.2001) (same); Thompson v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 918,925(9th Cr. 1998) (en
banc) (same); Rcdije, 139 F.3d at 273 (same).
45.
Wdivn, 330 F.3d at 282.
46.
Id

47.

Id

48.
Id; sw 28 U.S.C S 2244(b)(1) (2000) (requiring the dismissal of claims repeated in
subsequent habeas petitions; part of AEDPA).
49.
Wdliam, 330 F.3d at 282; se 28 U.S.C 5 2244(b)(2)(B) (providing for the dismissal of
claims not included in an initial habeas petition unless due diligence would not have uncovered the
new evidence at the time of trial, there was constitutional error, and there is clear and convincing
evidence that absent the error the outcome would have been different; part of AEDPA).
50.
William, 330 F.3d at 282 (quoting 28 U.S.C S 2244(b)(2)(B)(@-(h).
51.
Id at 283.
52.
Id The court reached this conclusion based on the fact thatpmseproposed applications
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ever, required the court to determine if the record established "by clear and
convincing evidence that but for the alleged subornation of perjury, no reasonable factfinder would have found Williams guilty of the charges against him." "
The Fourth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's holding in SazWer v Widey4
to guide its analysis."5 In Sawger, the Supreme Court established a standard on
which the language of S 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) was based. 6 Comparing the similar
evidence proffered in the two cases, the Fourth Circuit found that Wflliams's
evidence did not meet the Saver standard and, consequently, the standard in
2244(b)(2)(B)(ii)."7 The court held that the impeachment value of the evidence
proffered by Wlliams did not clearlyand convincinglyoutweigh other eyewitness
testimony ss The court concluded that because Williams's evidence failed Sauwr,
it also failed S2244(b)(2)(B). s9

IV. Appatic
A. Fowlkes
Any decision bythe Fourth Circuit dismissing a petitioner's claims "on the
merits" made prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Miifer-El can be used to
preclude, as second or successive, anysubsequent habeas petition under S2244.'
As the concurrence pointed out, the court relied on a veryshort one-line conclusion about the lack of merit in Fowlkes's claims from the initial habeas proceedings to denyFowlkes's PFA request. 61 The Miller-El court noted that the federal
courts of appeals are limited to determining whether an applicant can make a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right when deciding whether
to grant a ODA and cannot make a determination of the applicant's claims on the
merits at that point in time.62 The court should not have relied on its prior
decision, but instead considered the alternative presented in Judge Gregory's
should be construed liberally. Id (cting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (per

curiarn)).

53. Id
54. 505 U.S. 333 (1992).
55. Wdim, 330 F.3d at 283; seSawyerv. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333,335-37 (1992) (establishing
the standard eventually codified as 28 U.S.C 52244(b)(2)(B)(ii)).
56. Wdlivn, 330 F.3d at 283.
57. Id at 284.
58. Id
59. Id
60. Foulkes, 326 F.3d at 546.
61.

Id at 547-48 (Gregory,J., concurring).

62. 28 U.S.C S2253(c)(2) (2000) (requiring applicant for (OA to make asubstantialsho
of the denial of a constitutional right); se Miller.E, 537 U.S. at 348-49 (Scalia, J., conc=r
(pointing out flawed use of decisions on the merits when determining whether or not to grant a
COA); Szisher, 325 F.3d at 230 (acknowledging improper determinations on the merits).
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concurrence.63 Judge Gregory would have attempted to conform the court's
analysis to the language of AEDPA and at the same time achieve a degree of
uniformity among the circuits by adopting Judge Cudahy's test for determining
whether to grant permission to file a second or successive habeas petition."
Judge Gregory would have held that two of Fowikes's claims were barred byS
2244(b)(1) because they were included in the first habeas petition." However,
the impartial jury claim had not been adjudicated on the merits, but Judge
Gregory agreed with the majority's analysis that this claim would have been
barred under S2244(b)(2).6
B. Williams
If a defendant brings a new federal claim in postconviction proceedings, his
only recourse is a PFA request. In dismissing Williams's claims, the Fourth
Circuit adopted the Bemt definition of a "prima facie showing" under S
2244(b)(3)(q; therefore, appellate counsel must now conform any claims for
relief with an eye to the Seventh Crcuit's standard.67 Unlike an application for
a COA, in which a petitioner must make a substantial showing of the denial of
a constitutional right, the Bamvt standard only requires that a petitioner make"
'a sufficient showing of possible merit to warrant a fuller exploration by the
district court.'"" For a PFA request to succeed under Betit need onlyappear
" 'reasonably likely that the [motion] satisfies the stringent requirements'" of S
2244(b). 69 If, for example, a defendant offered new evidence of perjured testimony used at trial, the court would consider whether in light of this evidence "
'a sufficient showing of possible merit'" was made to warrant proceedings in
district court.7' It islikelythat the prima facie showing standard in Bevwtcreates
a lower threshold than the substantial showing stan
sin 2253 for the issu-

63. Foruke, 326 F.3d at 547-50 (Gregory,J., concurring).
64. Fozdke, 326 F.3d at 549 (Gregory J., concurring); se 28 US.C S 2244 (2000) (setting
forth requirements for fin second or successive habeas petition); Brmgm, 249 F.3d at 590
(Cndahy, J., concurrin ("A claim, specificallyin the context of the federal habeas statute, is a set
of facts giving rise to a right to a legal remedy. A claim is therefore distinguished by its facts
(specifically by its nucleus of operative facts), not just by the legal principle that it invokes or the
body of law from which it derives.").
65.
Foulkes, 326 F.3d at 550 (Gregory, J., concurring).
66.
Id

67. Wi/iam, 330 F.3d at 281; see 28 U.S.C S 2244(b)(3)(q (requiring prima facie showing
that claim satisfy S 2244(b) requirements); Beir 119 F.3d at 469-70 (providing the "prima facie
showing"
68.
69.
70.

standard to evaluate successive petitions under S 2255).
Willim, 330 F.3d at 281 (quoting Bang, 119 F.3d at 469-70).
Id (quoting Barn 119 F.3d at 469-70).
Id (quoting Brm. 119 F.3d at 469).
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ance of a GOA."1 With identical evidence, it is likely that a PFA request would
be granted where an application for a OA would be denied.
V. Caidiin
In Foulkes, the Fourth Grcuit has proven itself unwilling to take seriously
the strictures of AEDPA by continuing to follow its own admittedly incorrect
precedent. The court has widened the available precedent for precluding claims
insecond or successive habeas petitions under AEDPA by reviewing claims on
the merits when deciding whether to authorize a PFA request. Although the
court has admitted to this error in application, practitioners must be cognizant
of the fact that even an allusion to a possible decision on the merits in a per
curiam opinion could deny a client relief under S2244. Practitioners must be
careful to include all claims reasonably foreseeable in the initial habeas petition
to avoid the claim preclusive effect of S2244.
Terrence T. Egland

71.

See 28 U.S.C S 2253(c) (2000) (providing requirements for issuance of a certificate of

appealability part of AEDPA).

